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Abstract Smart cities involve the provision of advanced
services for road traffic users. Vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs) are a promising communication technology in
this regard. Preservation of privacy is crucial in these ser-
vices to foster their acceptance. Previous approaches have
mainly focused on PKI-based or ID-based cryptography.
However, these works have not fully addressed the mini-
mum information disclosure principle. Thus, questions such
as how to prove that a driver is a neighbour of a given
zone, without actually disclosing his identity or real address,
remain unaddressed. A set of techniques, referred to as
Attribute-Based Credentials (ABCs), have been proposed
to address this need in traditional computation scenarios.
In this paper, we explore the use of ABCs in the vehic-
ular context. For this purpose, we focus on a set of use
cases from European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI) Basic Set of Applications, specially appropriate
for the early development of smart cities. We assess which
ABC techniques are suitable for this scenario, focusing on
three representative ones—Idemix, U-Prove and VANET-
updated Persiano systems. Our experimental results show
that they are feasible in VANETs considering state-of-the-
art technologies, and that Idemix is the most promising
technique for most of the considered use cases.
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1 Introduction
Smart cities involve the management of different infrastruc-
tures in order to provide better services to citizens. Among
these services, those intended to improve road traffic play a
key role in smart cities development [3]. In order to achieve
this goal, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are being
developed. VANETs allow the exchange of information with
vehicles around and also with the traffic manager and other
service providers. In this way, VANETs enable not only traf-
fic management but also a plethora of services to enhance
citizens’ experience of travelling. In particular, the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has
defined the Basic Set of Applications (BSA), which “can
be deployed simultaneously at a targeted time (day 1) with
the objective to serve societal and business objectives of pri-
vate and public road transport stakeholders” [18]. Therefore,
BSA is a stepping stone towards the development of smart
cities.
However, despite their benefits, privacy is a key concern
in this facet of smart cities [22]. For example, given that
vehicles will be exchanging data with other entities, path
tracking becomes a feasible threat. What is more, the pas-
sive collection of data will enable the attacker to keep track
of driver’s and/or vehicle’s issues (e.g. behavior, prefer-
ences, and characteristics) and their automatic analysis [17,
43, 44].
To address the privacy issue, a plethora of contributions
have been proposed so far. Several approaches have mainly
focused on public key cryptography based on certificates
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[43], or ID-based (i.e. certificateless) cryptography [8]. Tra-
ditional PKI authentication systems were not designed to
provide any privacy protection [22, 23]; thus, in typical
PKI approaches, the use of certificates leads to unneces-
sarily revealing the identity of their holders as well as
other privacy-sensitive attributes [24]. In a more privacy-
preserving way, the use of pseudonyms has been proposed.
Pseudonyms are different identities to conceal the real one
to unauthorized parties [7]. However, privacy threats are still
possible when a pseudonym is used in scarce networks [22],
where even small correlations of data could reveal sensitive
information.
In a smart city context, when a driver or vehicle requests
a resource or service using VANET communications, the
provider only needs to verify if the vehicle is authorized to
access the requested issue. However, revealing more infor-
mation than necessary could lead to privacy risks [48]. Thus,
achieving minimum information disclosure, that is minimiz-
ing as much as possible the disclosed information (attributes
in this case) to achieve a goal, is of utmost relevance. This
property contributes to avoid data inference from a ser-
vice provider or a collusion of them. Credential holders
(e.g. drivers) must be able to disclose a subset of credential
attributes without giving away their identity or other private
information. In order to achieve this goal, Attribute-Based
Credentials (ABCs) have been explored [45, 55].
ABCs are slowly gaining momentum, and yet a num-
ber of ABC theoretical approaches exist [13, 35, 39, 40].
Regardless of ABC benefits, few proposals have suggested
applying them in the field of VANETs. [38] presents chal-
lenges and open issues regarding privacy and identity man-
agement in vehicular communication and point out ABCs as
a potential solution for addressing privacy needs in generic
scenarios; neither specific scenarios are discussed, nor an
evaluation of ABC’s applicability or technical feasibility is
introduced. Authors in [50] introduce a conceptual frame-
work including the use of ABCs, to provide trustworthy
vehicular communications, in their work, authors high-
lighted the need of evaluating different ABC technologies
in order to assess both: the privacy features offered by each
technology and their technical feasibility for VANET envi-
ronments. ABCs could enable, for instance, showing that a
driver is neighbour of a given zone, without actually dis-
closing his identity or real address. Nevertheless, developing
such an application requires a theoretical and practical anal-
ysis on the suitability of each ABC technique. This would
enable to take an informed decision on the best mechanism
for each VANET application.
To address this issue, this paper presents a feasibility
analysis of ABC techniques for the vehicular context which,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, remains unaddressed.
This issue has been pointed out as a research need [50]
due to the complexity of these technologies [60]. Thus,
the goal of this paper is to analyze how these systems can
be adapted to VANETs and to assess if such adaptation is
feasible and useful for VANET use cases. The analysis is
focused on a subset of the aforementioned BSA services in
which we identify privacy issues. We consider two major
ABC systems—Idemix [13] and U-Prove [39]—which have
not been assessed yet. This analysis is completed with a
third system, an updated version of Persiano’s ABC system
[25], as it has already been applied to the VANET con-
text. According to existing literature [31], our selection is
consistent in that it represents the two major families of
ABC systems, namely those based on blind signatures (U-
Prove) and those based on zero-knowledge proofs (Idemix,
Persiano). Furthermore, the ABC technology introduced in
[4] was afterwards discarded by the authors who devel-
oped more efficient technologies based on the specifications
provided by U-Prove and Idemix, and introduced them in
[34] and [57], respectively. Authors in [26] proposed an
anonymous credential system which was limited in func-
tionality, since it did not provide all privacy features offered
by Idemix and U-Prove. Therefore, we stick to the afore-
mentioned alternatives since they are more complete and
count with a working implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the related work. Section 3 introduces the required
background. Section 4 shows the road traffic services in
smart cities that can benefit from ABCs. Section 5 focuses
on how to adapt these techniques to the VANET con-
text. Section 6 performs a suitability assessment of the
so-adapted ABC technologies. Section 7 highlights several
open research directions. Finally, Section 8 draws the main
conclusions of the paper.
2 Related work
Credentials are essential in identity management systems.
They attest that an entity (e.g. user or vehicle) has a certain
type of feature, knowledge, skill, etc. A credential can be
composed of attributes with attached values, e.g. degree =
“science” or driverLicense = “yes”. In the field of
VANETs, public key digital certificates [27] are one of the
most used types of credentials. They attest that an entity
holds a particular public key. Their use is specially associ-
ated with providing authenticated communications, as well
as integrity and confidentiality in interchanged messages.
By contrast, in multiple scenarios (e.g. parking payment)
identity disclosure is not a mandatory requirement, since
only attribute verification is needed. As a privacy-preserving
solution to the problem, Brands presents the concept of dig-
ital credentials [9], as an instantiation of pseudonymous
systems proposed by Chaum [14]. One main point is that
credentials involve attributes of an entity without including
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identity information which allows linking the credential to
its owner. Furthermore, assuming that security and privacy
are among the most relevant aspects in VANETs, the actual
driver identity has to be revealed only to authorized entities,
as it could be used for malicious purposes otherwise [7].
Therefore, credentials are the first step towards anonymity
management.
Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable [42],
which actually means much more than just identity preser-
vation. Questions like ‘why should I reveal the age of my
vehicle when just the tax records are requested?’ or ‘why
should I reveal my postal address when just the driving
license is needed?’ are at stake. Chaum was one of the first
researchers to provide an answer to this kind of questions
[14]. He envisioned anonymous credentials systems. His
approach is based on a cryptographic scheme called blind
signatures in which signers neither learn the signed message
nor the identity of the individuals who request signatures
except for uncommon occasions, e.g. a court order.
An anonymous or ABC system consists of users who
obtain credentials from organizations and prove the posses-
sion of such credentials without disclosing values within
them. In these systems, transactions carried out by the same
user may not be linkable with each other.
Several works have been developed in relation to anony-
mous credentials. Nkenyereye et al. [36] presents an
attribute-based access control protocol to manage access
to services. In that work, anonymous credentials are used
to protect vehicles’ privacy but without detailing man-
agement processes. In [53], an identity-based encryption
system in VANETs is proposed to achieve the privacy
users desire and the traceability required by government
authorities. However, the way anonymous certificates are
applied is generally described but not detailed. Bu¨ttner et al.
[11] propose a system in which anonymous credentials
are used to get attribute-based authorization tickets. The
system is described but specifications regarding creden-
tials management are not provided. More recently, PUCA,
a pseudonym scheme with user-controlled anonymity for
VANETs is presented [20]. Anonymous credentials are
used for authentication purposes in car-to-X communica-
tions applying Camenisch et al. approach [13]. Chim et al.
[16] propose a VANET-based secure navigation protocol
which takes advantage of anonymous credentials to pro-
vide secure navigation services to drivers. In that work,
anonymous credential creation and management follow
Chaum’s approach which was later enhanced by Brands [9]
as well as Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [13]. Also looking for
anonymity Raya et al. [44] present a protocol based on anony-
mous keys to conceal vehicles’ identity. However, though
anonymous keys can be compared to credentials, their man-
agement and use is analogous to that of a public key infras-
tructure. Petit et al. [41] present a survey of pseudonyms
schemes in VANETs noticing that pseudonym-based cre-
dentials must be efficient to support real-time requirements
in applications. It can be extrapolated to anonymous certifi-
cates as it is pointed out that anonymous credentials are one
way of implementing one-time pseudonyms.
Apart from anonymous credential theoretical approaches,
two main implementations of these systems have been
developed—U-Prove technology from Microsoft [39] and
Idemix from IBM [13]. Some proposals have compared
their developments against these technologies, e.g. [35]
and [58] assess the efficiency of implementing U-Prove
and Idemix in smart cards, respectively. Specifically in the
vehicular context, to the best of the authors’ knowledge,
only Gonzalez-Tablas et al. [25] propose and implement an
ABC system, namely a VANET-updated version of Persiano
et al. scheme [40].
3 Background
This section provides the reader with an introduction to
VANETs (Section 3.1) and a brief description of the
three Privacy-ABC techniques considered in this paper,
namely U-Prove, Idemix and the VANET-updated version of
Persiano (Section 3.2).
3.1 Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs)
Information and communication technologies in the vehicu-
lar context encouraged the emergence of new services called
intelligent transport systems (ITS) [59]. ITS facilitate the
presentation of immediate and accurate information con-
cerning road traffic status or entertainment services, e.g info
about the nearest shopping malls or restaurants. Therefore,
ITS can be seen as an instantiation of location-based ser-
vices (LBS) [51]. However, ITS also consider other traffic-
and safety-related aspects for the service provision.
In order to realize ITS, different architectures have been
proposed. Apart from regional initiatives, such as the Euro-
pean ITS architecture [21], standardized approaches are
gaining attention. In particular, ISO 21217 standard defines
the entities at stake as well as their internal structure.
Thus, the main elements are Road-Side Units (RSUs), On-
Board Units (OBUs), central ITS stations and personal ITS
stations. Each one is introduced below.
RSUs are communication nodes placed aside roads to
behave as a proxy between vehicles and infrastructure. On
the other hand, OBUs are vehicle-mounted devices to allow
the exchange of data with RSUs and other surrounding
OBUs. These devices are resource-constrained, which poses
a performance challenge when designing applications and
services. Central ITS stations are infrastructure elements
that provide with ITS-based services. Finally, personal ITS
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stations are portable devices that may offer services to its
owner (say the driver or a passenger).
In order for these entities to communicate with each
other, different technologies may be applied. In particular,
both short-range and long-range alternatives are considered.
For short range, dedicated short-range communications
(DSRC) are being developed following standard family
IEEE 1609 [29]. DSRC is reserved for automotive traf-
fic safety applications using vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I/I2V) communications form-
ing vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). On the other
hand, 3G is representative for long-range communications.
From the architectural point of view, the said entities
present significant similarities. On the one hand, all of
them contain a gateway if they are connected to more than
one network. For example, it is the case of OBUs, since
they need to share information between its network and
that internal of the vehicle. Similarly, they contain a router
to exchange packets with other ITS entities. Considering
OBUs again, the router enables V2V or V2I/I2V communi-
cations. Furthermore, a central element called ITS-SU (ITS
Station Unit) properly handles each packet by executing
applications.
As ABC-related protocols can be seen as applications
themselves, in the following, we focus on ITS-SU com-
position (Fig. 1). Particularly, it is organized following an
ISO-layered protocol stack. Thus, the access, networking
and transport, facilities and application elements offer their
services by leveraging on what the immediate inferior pro-
vides. Additionally, the management and security elements
offer transversal services to the said components.
Fig. 1 ITS-SU architecture according to ISO 21217 [30]. The security
entity is further decomposed
The security component is specially relevant for the
sake of this work. In particular, Fig. 1 shows its four
sub-components. A firewall and an intrusion detection sys-
tem prevent network attacks such as illegal accesses. On
the other hand, an authentication, authorization and profile
management cares about these procedures. For this purpose,
it cooperates with the Security Management Information
Base (S-MIB) which manages cryptographic credentials and
certificates. These elements are stored in a special device
called hardware security module (HSM). This module is
assumed to provide with secure storage, reliable time source
and cryptographic capabilities [37].
One important remark is that the security aspects are not
fully refined in ISO 21217. Particularly, the definition of
which of the said elements (gateway, router, ITS-SU) have
to carry out each security operation has not been clarified.
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality,
in this work, we assume that ABC-related operations are
carried out by the security component of ITS-SU.
3.2 Attribute-Based Credentials fundamentals
ABC technologies have been designed to enhance users’
privacy. For several years, they have been investigated as
part of anonymous credential systems and group signa-
tures [15]. ABCs are issued like ordinary cryptographic
credentials (e.g. X.509 credentials) using a digital (secret)
signature key [45]—basically a PKI with privacy-enhancing
features. In ABCs, the main enhancing feature is that cre-
dential’s attributes could be transformed into unlinkable and
non-transferable presentation tokens1 able to protect the
holder’s privacy, while offering the same level of security. In
the following sections, participant roles and involved phases
are described. The set of features provided by ABCs are
presented in Section 3.4, after presenting each technique in
detail.
3.2.1 Roles
Roles within a general ABC system are defined as follows:
– Issuer: it is an infrastructure-based (trusted) identity
provider also known as an attribute authority; this entity
or organization is responsible of issuing credentials, that
is, a certified container of attributes where an attribute
has a type and a value (e.g. first name, Bob). It is
also responsible for vouching for the correctness of the
information contained in the credentials; therefore, the
issuer might request other means of authentication prior
to credential issuance.
1A presentation token is a digitally signed container of attribute
information [46].
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– Users: entities to which the identity providers (issuers)
will issue the ABCs. They will use these credentials to
assert claims about their identity to service providers.
– Verifier: any relying party willing to protect access to
resources, information or services.
– Revocation Authority: this entity is responsible for
revoking issued credentials and preventing their further
usage. A revocation authority is not a mandatory entity
in typical ABC systems.
– Inspector: it consists of a trusted authority comprised of
either a single entity or a multi-party cooperation. The
inspector’s role is to de-anonymize the user under spe-
cific situations (e.g. misuse or liability). The inclusion
of this entity is not mandatory in traditional approaches.
Ideally, the capability of inspection should be done in
a distributed fashion, and it must be compliant with a
policy that specifies which information should be recover-
able by an inspector and under which circumstances.
3.2.2 Phases
In an ABC system, the following phases are distinguished:
– Set-up: it is performed only once by each entity of
the system. A trusted authority generates all public and
secret global parameters used by the entities of the sys-
tem. At the end of this phase, the issuer is ready to
release credentials to users and the verifier is ready to
validate such credentials.
– Issuance: an issuer can issue a credential without being
related to any existing credential owned by the user.
– Presentation: it is one of the most important stages from
the ABC life-cycle. Verifiers request a credential and
users provide it (or a presentation token derived from it)
to be later verified.
– Revocation: credentials are revoked by the revocation
authority, which is also responsible for making avail-
able updated revocation information.
– Inspection: there are scenarios in which it is necessary
to de-anonymize the credential holder. This is achieved
by performing token inspection. Conditional anonymity
is provided if and only if a token was generated in
compliance with a policy specifying which informa-
tion could be revealed and under which conditions.
A typical example is the case of misbehaving nodes.
The process of de-anonymization is restricted to autho-
rized entities and it should ideally require a multi-party
intervention.
3.3 ABC systems
This section describes the considered ABC systems, namely
Idemix [13], U-Prove [39] and the VANET-updated version
of Persiano [25]. Note that the first pair of ABC technolo-
gies are jointly described due to their working similarities.
3.3.1 Idemix and U-Prove
Idemix (short for Identity Mixer) [28], developed and dis-
tributed by IBM, and U-Prove [33] of Microsoft are two
examples of the most prominent ABC technologies cur-
rently available. Both technologies represent a suite of
cryptographic libraries that can be combined into a func-
tional ABC system. In terms of their construction, the main
difference between the two technologies consists in the type
of the digital signature scheme being used. While Idemix’s
main building block is the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya digital
signature scheme [12], U-Prove [33] is based on the Brands’
digital signature scheme [10] instead.
Both technologies support most of the common features
of ABCs. However, there are some practical differences
between them in the degree of privacy they provide (see
Section 3.4), their efficiency and the methods that can be
used to practically construct them. For instance, U-Prove’s
design allows the use of elliptic curves instead of standard
subgroups, which could result in better efficiency. However,
in this paper, we focus on the available implementations,
which are based on the latter.
Details on how both systems carry out each phase are
given below (Fig. 2):
– Set-up: it is performed once by each of the entities
in the system except by the user. In the case of the
issuer, it generates a credential specification, issuer
parameters and a secret issuance key used to issue cre-
dentials. The credential specification describes the type
of attributes encoded in a credential and the corre-
sponding encoding mechanism (e.g. cryptographic hash
function). Issuer parameters are cryptographic informa-
tion used by service providers to verify the authenticity
of presentation tokens, i.e. issuer’s public key, identifier
of a cryptographically secure hash algorithm, revoca-
tion information -if revocation process is supported, etc.
The issuance key (secret key) needs to be kept secret
and it is used by the issuer to issue credentials.
– Issuance: issuance of a credential is an interactive proto-
col between the user and the issuer, and works similarly
for both Idemix and U-Prove. A difference in the pro-
tocol flow is the number of protocol rounds (and the
corresponding number of messages during each round).
In the case of Idemix, issuance of a credential is done
in a single protocol round (two messages exchanged);
the user first requests a credential, and if eligible, the
issuer produces a credential by signing a statement con-
taining the corresponding attributes [28]. In the case of
U-Prove, it requires two rounds (four messages); the
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Fig. 2 Idemix and U-Prove
protocol. Issuance and
verification phases
user first requests a credential, and if eligible, the issuer
generates a signature specific for the requested creden-
tial. Afterwards, the user generates a proof using the
U-Prove token’s public key, user and issuer parameters,
on reception the issuer generates the corresponding cre-
dential. In both cases, the issuer defines an issuance
policy that describes the requirements that must be
met by the user in order to get a credential and con-
tains the identifiers of the credential specification and
the issuer parameters of the credential to be issued.
The user receives the issuance policy and generates
an issuance token. The issuance token contains crypto-
graphic information required by the issuance policy, the
token is generated from the token description and the
proof generation (ZKProof). Upon reception, the issuer
verifies the proof and generates the credential, i.e., a
zero-knowledge proof containing issuer’s blind signa-
ture on the credential, the issuer-set attributes and if
applicable the revocation information.
– Presentation: Idemix and U-Prove protocols work quite
similar. For a particular requested policy, a presenta-
tion token is delivered. The presentation policy may
define the type of credential(s) that are accepted, which
attributes must be disclosed, and potentially the pred-
icates that should be used. Predicates over attributes
consist of statements that allow the user proving cer-
tain property of an attribute value without disclosing the
actual value (e.g. birthdate < 1993/01/01). The presen-
tation token includes a cryptographic evidence for the
possession of a credential by proving the knowledge
of the credential secret by the user, token information
such as validity period, and cryptographic commitments
to the encoded attributes (a commitment is the product
of generators with attributes and a secret key as their
exponents). When the verifier receives the presentation
token, it verifies that the statements are logically sat-
isfied as well as the validity of the cryptographic
evidence.
– Revocation: the revocation mechanism implemented
for both U-Prove and Idemix requires that both users
and verifiers have the most recent revocation infor-
mation from the corresponding revocation authority.
There are two different settings for revocation: (1)
issuer-driven revocation (global context), this approach
requires that any presentation token should be proved
against the most recent revocation information, which
mainly requires online interaction. Additionally, nodes
are responsible for updating their non-revocation evi-
dence, which can derive potential privacy risks due to
timing correlations, especially when performed at pre-
sentation time; (2) verifier-driven revocation (specific
context), this approach can be done offline, it consists
of a black list of attribute values managed by the veri-
fier. It is worth mentioning that this approach will only
affect the specific verifier and does not have any global
effect.
– Inspection: Idemix and U-Prove share the implementa-
tion of a mechanism that only supports one inspector.
This entity is able to uncover inspectable attributes
which can lead to the identification of the credential
owner. Note that by default Idemix and U-Prove tokens
are anonymous and can only become inspectable if
defined in the presentation policy.
3.3.2 VANET-updated Persiano
This technology is based on the use of anonymous creden-
tials to prove their on-the-fly holdership in the context of
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Fig. 3 VANET-updated
Persiano protocol. Issuance and
verification phases
VANETs for motor vehicles. Its phases work as follows
(Fig. 3):
– Set-up: as in previous techniques, public and secret
parameters are established. In this updated version, each
user receives a set of single-use certificates each of them
linked to a pseudonym (CERT ).
– Issuance: the user requests a credential and demon-
strates the possession of certain attributes (in a non-
anonymous fashion). Once the proof is successful, the
issuer provides a signed credential whose signature is
finally verified.
– Verification: the user and the verifier enrol in a cre-
dential joint proving process, comprised of an offline
and an online part. In the former part, the user cre-
ates a set of commitments and proves their ownership
constructing four Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
(ZK-PoKs). In the online part, the verifier requests a
presentation token (called proof) and the user provides
the computed ZK-PoKs (and one certificate of the set
CERT ). Finally, when the verification is performed,
the result is published in a public repository which is
later accessed by the user. This allows the user having
feedback, which is specially useful when failing this
verification involves sanctions.
– Revocation: the certificate of the set CERT , involved
in the creation of the presentation token, can be revoked.
This action can be seen as a temporal de-registration
of the vehicle (e.g. after verification, driving taxes are
found to be unpaid).
– Inspection: certificates within the set CERT allow
the retrieval of the user’s identity for the authorized
entity (i.e. traffic agency). In this way, it is possible to
de-anonymize a given credential holder when needed.
3.4 Privacy features. Analysis per mechanism
This section introduces the most relevant features pro-
vided by ABC techniques and compares them against each
mechanism. Eleven privacy features can be identified:
– Issuance unlinkability: the issuer cannot link an issued
credential to the presentation of such credential.
– Multi-show unlinkability: a credential can be used multiple
times without the resulting evidence becoming linkable.
– Selective disclosure of attributes: allows users to prove
only a subset of attributes to a verifier.
– Predicate proof: it consists of statements that allow
to prove a property of an attribute without disclosing
its actual value. Example of these statements are the
logical operators > or <.
– Proof of holdership: a cryptographic evidence for prov-
ing ownership or possession of a credential without
disclosing the attributes contained in that credential.
– Non-transferability: key binding can be used to bind one
or more credentials of the user to the same secret and
discourage users to perform credential pooling.
– Scope-exclusive pseudonyms: a certified pseudonym
unique for a specific scope and secret key, i.e. a single
pseudonym can be created for each credential.
– Carry-over attributes: it relies on the assumption that the
user already possesses a credential, from which a given
attribute can be carried over into the new credential
without disclosing the attribute value to the issuer.
– Cross-credential proofs: it allows users to prove rela-
tions between attributes from two or more credentials
without revealing them to the verifier. For instance, that
the name contained on a credit card and on a passport
match.
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– De-anonymization: it is an optional feature that allows
an authority (either alone or in cooperation with other
entities) to reveal the identity of users in cases of
accountability and non-repudiation.
– Revocation: in case of misuse, it allows the revoca-
tion of issued credentials to (misbehaving) users. Thus,
revoked credentials cannot longer be used to generate
presentation tokens.
Based on the aforementioned features, the chosen mech-
anisms are compared in terms of their supported privacy and
privacy-influencing features. Table 1 summarizes the main
results, where
√
, P and − respectively denote that a feature
is completely, partially or not provided.
All three given technologies provide issuance unlink-
ability, while only Idemix and VANET-updated Persiano
provide natively the functionality of multi-show unlink-
ability. In the case of U-Prove, to be able to guarantee
unlinkability, the use of the same token in two different
transactions must be avoided.
The three technologies enable attribute hiding, selective
disclosure of attributes, and use of predicates over certain
attributes, which make them suitable for scenarios where
minimal information disclosure must be guaranteed.
Also, all three technologies support anonymous proof of
possession of a credential, which allows users to prove hold-
ership of a credential without disclosing the credential, as
well as the non-transferability of credentials, aimed at dis-
couraging users to perform credential pooling and at the
same time enforcing non-repudiation.
Limited usage of credential and scope-based
pseudonymity are both supported by U-Prove and Idemix;
this is particularly useful in scenarios where users are
restricted to a single pseudonym for a given scope, e.g. for
accessing a certain website where multiple votes from the
same user should be avoided.
Carry-over attributes is a feature that is supported by
Idemix and U-Prove, while cross-credential proofs are sup-
ported by the three ABC schemes. The latter is a highly
relevant feature in scenarios where the user is offered to
access either joint services or a single service that requires
to prove holdership of two or more credentials, e.g. a
service-related credential and an authority-based creden-
tial. Finally, in cases of user misbehavior, both revocation
and de-anonymization are supported by the three schemes,
providing in this way the possibility of accountability.
However, Persiano offers de-anonymization in a more con-
strained way than the other mechanisms, since it does not
involve multi-party cooperation to reveal the identity.
4 Road traffic services benefiting from ABCs
After presenting the background on VANETs and ABCs,
this section focuses on motivating why applying the latter
to the former. In recent years, smart city services built on
top of VANETs are being proposed. Among them, ETSI TR
102 638 [18] points out a set of them to be available in the
‘day 1’, thus being specially relevant for the early devel-
opment of smart cities. This set is referred to as Basic Set
of Applications (BSA). In this section, the subset of appli-
cations of BSA that can benefit from ABC is identified,
along with their related use cases. After analysing their pri-
vacy needs and considering the privacy features per ABC
technique already introduced, this section finishes with the
election of the most theoretically suitable technique for each
use case.
4.1 Applications and use cases
In BSA, four classes of applications are distinguished,
namely Active road safety, Cooperative traffic efficiency,
Cooperative local services and Global internet services.
For each class, different set of applications, use cases and
attributes are distinguished. Among the seven applications
and 33 use cases of BSA, Table 2 depicts in italic those
applications and use cases that can leverage ABCs. For each
one, the set of attributes at stake is identified, clarifying
if they may be jointly proved (marked with J) or indepen-
dently (I). Besides the applied communication protocol is
also specified in Table 2. This may be an Internet connection
through IPv6 or RSU communication through DSRC.
In the following, the use of ABCs in BSA applications is
described, particularized per use case:
– Enhanced route guidance and navigation: RSU pro-
vides passing-by vehicles with travel itinerary infor-
mation downloaded from servers based on particu-
lar requirements. However, the interaction between
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Table 2 Road traffic services for smart cities benefiting from ABCs
Applications class Application Use case Attributes Com. protocol
Active road safety Driving assistance - Co-operative
awareness
− − −
Driving assistance - Road Danger
Warning
− − −





Enhanced route guidance and
navigation
Positive current account (J),
already paid (I), discount (J)
IPv6
Limited access warning and
detour notification
Reserved parking place X (J),






Automatic access control and
parking management
Reserved parking number (J),
discount (J), already paid (J), pos-




Positive current account (J),
already paid (I), discount (J)
DSRC
Media downloading Positive current account (J),
already paid (I), discount (J),








Positive current account (J),
already paid (I), discount (J)
IPv6
Fleet management Involved in fleet X (I) IPv6
Loading zone management Vehicle type (I) DSRC
ITS station life cycle
management
− − −
Legend: (J) joint proving, (I) single proving
vehicles and internet servers may involve some trans-
actions. They may affect privacy due to requested data.
For instance, to download an itinerary, vehicles may
have to attest that they have paid some fee. How-
ever, it has to be done anonymously, without disclosing
any information of the vehicle or the driver. Anony-
mous credentials may attest a fee paid, the positive
current account or the existence of a discount without
disclosing further information.
– Limited access warning and detour notification: vehi-
cles are warned of some road limit access, restriction
or access control need. Other itinerary may be recom-
mended to avoid a restricted area. Limitations may be
related to the type of vehicle or, in general, it may be
necessary to provide some information to gain access.
For instance, a road that goes to a particular city dis-
trict is closed to everybody except for those that attest
they have a parking place in it. ABCs avoid showing the
exact parking place of a vehicle but they allow attesting
vehicles can park in a particular city district.
– Automatic access control and parking management:
accessing or leaving a controlled area, e.g. a parking,
requires the entitled vehicle to supply its identity. How-
ever, privacy is a key security issue in this regard.
Providing information, such as having paid the monthly
fee, having a particular parking place reserved, have a
discount or a positive current account have to be carried
out anonymously without disclosing vehicle’s owner
data and without being able to link multiple parking
transactions of a given car.
– ITS local electronic commerce: RSUs signal some
service, i.e. point of interest or location-based ser-
vice, which requires local payment for reservation
and/or purchasing. Vehicles have to pay accordingly
but without disclosing any private information. They
may use anonymous credentials to attest that they have
some kind of discount or prove they have paid it in
advance.
– Media downloading: RSUs provide multimedia to pas-
sengers with or without internet access. Download-
ing can be conditioned by a commercial transaction.
Therefore, multimedia access may depend on provided
data, e.g. downloading a film has some cost, whose
delivery should prevent privacy issues. The use of
anonymous credentials to attest, e.g. after having paid
a fee, owning a voucher to access free content or being
client of the downloading service, avoids privacy data
disclosures.
– Insurance and financial services: on-demand and real-
time interaction to a financial or insurance service, e.g.
pay as you drive. As in other applications, the use of
anonymous credentials for committing to a payment
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Enhanced route guidance and
navigation
√ √ √ √ √ √
Limited access warning and
detour notification
√ √ − √ √ √
Automatic access control and
parking management
√ √ √ √ √ √
ITS local electronic commerce
√ √ √ √ √ √
Media downloading
√ √ √ √∗ √ √
Insurance and financial services
√ √ √ √ √ √
Fleet management
√ √ √ √∗ − √
Loading zone management
√ √ √ √ − √
and for being authenticated preserves privacy avoiding
the disclosure of more information than the one needed.
– Fleet management: RSUs provide and collect data
from vehicle fleet management data. Vehicles can, for
instance, apply anonymous credentials to attest their
private involvement in a particular fleet. Thus, e.g. a
bus of a given company entering a parking lot just
requires a credential attesting the relationship between
the bus (driver) and the company without disclosing any
identifying information.
– Loading zone management: drivers, fleet managers and
road operators need support regarding booking, mon-
itoring and management of the urban parking zones.
They have the possibility to book in advance an
urban loading bay specifying the delivery mission,
the planned delivery time frame, the loading/unloading
time required, the vehicle type and the estimated time
to reach the parking zone. Anonymous credentials can
be used to provide information preserving privacy, e.g.
without disclosing vehicle’s owner identity when just
the vehicle type is required.
Without ABCs, a naive provision of these applications
involves the excessive disclosure of information, thus threat-
ening users’ privacy. For example, in case of economic
transactions, users have to provide their credit card informa-
tion which discloses, among other issues, their names and
surnames. Other examples are related to the vehicle’s type
and the parking place. In the former case, vehicles’ logbook
shows vehicles’ type and other data such as the vehicles’
identity number or where/who sold them. In the latter case,
the parking place can be attested showing drivers’ iden-
tity card but it shows the exact location of drivers’ home
together with additional data like drivers’ birth date.
4.2 Privacy requirements per use case
The set of identified use cases need privacy preservation to
some extent. This section explores which requirements are






A total of 12 general VANET privacy requirements have
been identified across works by different authors [17, 19,
20, 43, 48]. One important remark is that most of them are
the same than the identified ABC features. This aspect is
relevant to decide which ABC technique to apply for each
VANET use case. This issue is studied in Section 4.3.
Among these 12 requirements, 6 of them are privacy
needs (Table 3) whereas the remaining 6 are privacy-related
ones (Table 4). With respect to the first group, the first
requirement is minimal information disclosure, by which
vehicles and drivers may disclose a set of attributes while
keeping others hidden [46]. This need is present in all use
cases, as it means to minimize the data leakage to the
remaining entities.
On the other hand, conditional anonymity allows drivers
and vehicles to be de-anonymized in cases of liability (e.g.
due to offences) [43]. This action must be restricted to
authorized entities and under certain circumstances. This is
also needed in all use cases as this deters misbehavior.
A related requirement is having distributed (multi-party)
inspection, by which de-anonymization is carried out by
cooperation of several entities to prevent abuses. This is
required in some applications, such as ITS local electronic
commerce. In this use case, the bank together with the par-
ticular electronic service should cooperate to de-anonymize.
On the contrary, this is not needed in fleet management and
loading zone management. In the former use case, the fleet
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Table 4 Summary of privacy-related properties needed for each application








Enhanced route guidance and
navigation
√ √ √ √∗ √ √∗
Limited access warning and
detour notification
√ √ √ − √ √∗
Automatic access control and
parking management
√ √ √ − √ √∗
ITS local electronic commerce
√ √ √ √∗ √ √∗
Media downloading
√ √ √ √∗ √ √∗
Insurance and financial services
√ √ √ − √ √∗
Fleet management
√ − √ √∗ − −
Loading zone management
√ √ √ − − −
service is the only one interested in the inspection process
and similarly, in the latter, the loading entity/manager is
the only one who wants to perform the inspection process.
Then, in both cases, abuses are not a concern.
Regarding privacy-preservation by continuous observa-
tion of a given vehicle, unlinkability comes into play.2 This
prevents two different transactions performed by the same
vehicle to be linked. There are two variants of this require-
ment, namely issuance-show and multi-show unlinkability.
In the former, the authority issuing a credential cannot link
the credential with the presentation tokens being shown to a
service provider. Thus, it is not needed in use cases in which
the issuing authority is the same that checks the creden-
tials or belongs to the public domain, such as limited access
warning and detour notification. The remaining applications
have this requirement. Consider ITS electronic commerce,
the credential attesting having a positive account balance
can be provided by a bank authority and verified by a given
service provider.
With respect to multi-show unlinkability, it allows drivers
and vehicles to prove possession of credentials (i.e. present
tokens) multiple times without being linkable across differ-
ent sessions, transactions or domains. This is needed in all
identified use cases except for media downloading and fleet
management. In both use cases, this requirement is desirable
because even users are linked between different uses of a
credential; they do not involve high privacy risk, in contrast
to others like limited access warning and detour notification
which, i.e. allow users tracking.
2It is worth to mention that untraceability is considered an inherent
characteristic of unlinkability—if some entities are unlinkable, then
they are untraceable.
Another requirement is perfect forward privacy [48]. It
states that the de-anonymization of one credential should
only reveal information associated with such credential and
should not reveal any information that could decrease the
unlikability of other credentials of the same user. This
requirement is present in all use cases to prevent abuses
by collusion of different service providers. Otherwise, de-
anonymizing a misbehaving driver of the access control use
case could lead to guess that she was the same buying a
given service through ITS electronic commerce.
Concerning privacy-related requirements, the first one is
proof of holdership. Thanks to this, vehicles and drivers
have the ability to prove holdership of a credential to a
verifier without disclosing the actual credential. As in the
previous case, this is critical for all use cases because all
of them need to verify the possession before granting the
service.
On the other hand, non-transferability prevents creden-
tial pooling by binding a set of credentials to a user’s (e.g.
vehicle owner or driver) secret key. In this way, several users
cannot collude to get a service that would be unattainable
for them separately. Remarkably, this need is not present in
fleet management, since a vehicle belonging to a company’s
fleet may be driven by any employee, so the credential must
be transferable between drivers.
The revocation requirement allows invalidating a creden-
tial when needed. This may be because of compromise (e.g.
stolen vehicle) or due to credential refreshing (e.g. a vehi-
cle’s owner changing his parking place). These two reasons
may be present in all use cases, thus motivating this need for
all of them.
Some use cases also require scope-exclusive pseudo-
nyms. These pseudonyms are unique for a specific scope
or application. This allows the provider to profile drivers
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and/or vehicles by ensuring that a single pseudonym is cre-
ated from a corresponding credential. Four use cases have
this requirement, namely enhanced route guidance and nav-
igation, ITS local electronic commerce, media downloading
and fleet management. The first three applications may
involve belonging to a particular service, thus owning a cre-
dential regarding the use of such service. Additionally, fleet
management involves attributes related to membership of a
fleet which are limited to this scope. This requirement is
desirable in all cases but not mandatory because, among
other issues, these credentials are not expected to be used
in other scenarios. Likewise, even these credentials were
used in different scopes, these use cases do not involve
high privacy risk by just avoiding the satisfaction of this
requirement.
In scenarios in which service providers need to ver-
ify different credentials from a given user, cross-credential
proving may appear. Thanks to this, multiple credentials
from the same or different issuers can be jointly proven in
the same presentation token; with this feature, vehicles and
drivers are able to access joint services offered by different
providers. This is the case of all applications except for fleet
management and loading zone management. Credentals can
be provided by, for instance, bank authorities, e.g. to attest
positive balance; web services, e.g. to attest users member-
ship; or council authorities, e.g. to attest the ownership of
a parking place in a concrete area. For example, in media
downloading, it may be needed to proof membership and a
positive balance in the bank account. Conversely, regarding
fleet management and loading zone management, the use of
a single credential is identified and thus, this property does
not apply.
Last but not the least, carry-over attributes allow that
newly issued credentials may contain attribute values from
other credentials without the issuer learning them. This
feature is specially relevant in VANETs since some cur-
rent credentials (e.g. taxes and licenses) are periodically
renewed. It may be relevant to accumulate the seniority. It
is a desirable property in all use cases except for fleet man-
agement and loading zone management as the credentials at
stake are not likely to be renewable.
4.3 ABC techniques per use case. Theoretical analysis
Once the analysis of privacy features per VANET use case
has been presented, a theoretical selection of the most
suitable ABC technique is presented herein. In particular,
recalling that each technique provides with a different set
of privacy properties (recall Section 3.4), it is possible to
determine which technique best fits for each use case.
In order to address this issue, it is necessary to clarify
how ABC features and VANET requirements match. Partic-
ularly, it is noticeable that Selective disclosure of attributes
and Predicate proofs Privacy-ABC features, are related to
Minimal information disclosure in VANETs. Similarly, De-
anonymization Privacy-ABC feature leads to Conditional
anonymity and Distributed inspection VANETs properties.
Moreover, Perfect forward privacy appears as a VANET pri-
vacy property which has not been currently implemented in
Privacy-ABC.
Table 5 presents results of the analysis where
√
means
suitable, − the contrary and √∗ partially suitable. Con-
cerning studied use cases, it is noteworthy that all of them
can leverage Idemix since it provides with all privacy and
privacy-related features.
On the other hand, media downloading can be addressed
by all techniques though under several premises. U-Prove
can be applied if multi-show unlinkability is avoided and
Persiano updated can be used when scope-exclusive and
carry-over attributes are not an issue. Besides, fleet manage-
ment application can be applied by Idemix in any circum-
stances and by U-Prove as long as multi-show unlinkability
is not at stake.
5 Tailoring ABCs to VANETs
Section 4 has shown different road traffic services for smart
cities that could benefit from ABCs. Nevertheless, one open
issue is how to adapt these mechanisms to vehicular net-
works. This section focuses on this matter. For this purpose,
the VANET architecture presented in Section 3.1 is consid-
ered. Section 5.1 describes how each ABC role is taken by
each VANET entity. Afterwards, Section 5.2 addresses how
each phase is carried out in these networks.
5.1 Distribution of roles
This section describes how each ABC role may be imple-
mented in the VANET context.
– Issuer: this role can be taken by a regional vehicular
registration authority, the vehicle manufacturer, public
administration entities, or any service provider, such as
telecommunication operators. The particular entity at
stake depends on the considered ITS service. In any
case, all of them are realized in a Central ITS station.
In particular, there are two components of its ITS-SU at
stake. The Applications one contains the issuance policy
and the credential creation procedure itself. On the other
hand, the Security one (and, in particular, its S-MIB and
the HSM) is in charge of creating the credentials and
storing the materials needed for future verification.
– Users: this role is represented by vehicles and drivers. In
the case of vehicles, ABCs will be bound to the owner
of the vehicle (e.g. individual or a company). This
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Table 5 Analysis of ABC technique suitable for each use case
Idemix U-Prove VANET-updated Persiano
Enhanced route guidance and navigation
√ − −
Limited access warning and
√ − −
detour notification
Automatic access control and
√ − −
parking management










decision is in line with current laws in several coun-
tries in which the owner is liable for traffic offences
until the driver gets identified (e.g. UK, [1]). Thus,
the OBU-internal ITS-SU comes into play. Particularly,
the Applications element dictates when authentication
is required, whereas the Authentication module of the
Security element carries out the related cryptographic
processes. For this purpose, again the S-MIB and HSM
will cooperate.
In the case of the driver, it is her personal ITS station
which participates in the process. The elements at stake
are the same than in the vehicle case.
– Verifier: as it happened with the issuer role, differ-
ent entities may be verifiers according to the service
or application at stake. Thus, RSUs, other vehicles,
public administration authorities (e.g. police and traf-
fic authorities), and service providers (e.g. emergency
services and location-based commercial services) may
take this role. Therefore, this role may be performed
through Road-side ITS stations, Central ITS stations or
OBU stations. In all cases, the components at stake are
Applications and Security in the same terms as in the
issuance.
– Revocation authority and inspector: revocation is a
requirement to prevent misbehaving or faulty vehicles
to communicate and threat the proper operation of the
network. To this extent, the inspector becomes active
in cases of accountability. These roles are mainly taken
by the regional vehicular registration authority. Vehi-
cle manufacturers and service providers may also take
these roles in particular cases such as misuse. As in the
previous cases, Central ITS stations are at stake, partic-
ularly their Applications and Security components.
5.2 Implementation of phases
This section shows how the general ABC phases (recall
Section 3.2.2) are implemented in VANETs. Each one is
studied below. We omit the sequence diagram for the Revo-
cation phase since it is an internal process carried out by the
credential issuer.
– Set-up: all entities have to be equipped with required
cryptographic materials. Importantly, credentials issued
by a trusted CA (regional vehicular authority) are stored
in the HSM of the ITS entity at stake (Roadside ITS
station, OBU ITS station, Personal ITS station). The
procedure is shown in messages 1–11 of Fig. 4. Man-
agement and distribution of the credential specification
and issuer parameters can be done either leveraging
on regular vehicular processes (e.g. yearly inspection,
tax renewal, etc.) or using over-the-air (OTA) updates
managed by the Security component. It must be noted
that secure OTA software updates have already been
considered for vehicular platforms [49].
– Issuance: this phase is shown in messages 12–27 of
Fig. 4. At first, the vehicle will provide either the Cer-
tID or the full certificate to the issuer (msg. 12). Such
certificate could also consist of a short-term certificate
based on an underlying pseudonym solution. The vehi-
cle may provide with the requested proofs as introduced
in Section 3.3. On successful validation, the issuer will
then prepare the corresponding ABCs (msgs. 13–19).
Simple issuance in VANET will include key binding
(i.e. making two or more credentials bind to the same
key). This will discourage users in VANETs to give
away their credentials. Moreover, service providers may
request users to prove that they are authorized to com-
municate in the VANET system, and at the same time
authorized to access their resources. Thus, a proof of
holdership of multiple credentials bound to the same
key (i.e. cross-credential proving, recall Section 3.4) is
needed. Carry-over credentials may also be issued, as a
means of adding new properties to existing credentials
(e.g. extensions to the insurance policy). Once created,
these materials are sent to the OBU HSM (msgs. 20–27).
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Fig. 4 Setup and issuance phases of ABC according to VANET architecture
– Presentation: this phase starts by creating the commit-
ments that will be at stake to anonymously prove one
or more attributes. The procedure is shown in Fig. 5.
For the sake of simplicity, the message in which the
prover asks for credentials is omitted from Fig. 5. Thus,
after the said creation (messages 1–10), the verifier asks
for the required proof considering a given policy (msg.
11). The Application component of the OBU collab-
orates with the Security MIB and the HSM to build
up the presentation token according to the specified
policy (msgs. 12–24). The Application at the verifier
then checks the token validity and the commitment cor-
rectness (msgs. 25–39). It must be noted that for this
purpose, its Security MIB and HSM are involved.
– Revocation: there can be many reasons for revoking
a credential, e.g. a malicious attacker sending spoofed
or forged information that might jeopardize the secu-
rity and safety of vehicles in the network. This process
is carried out by the authority, being this information
spread to all VANET entities to ensure a proper exclu-
sion of revoked parties.
– Inspection: this task has to be done by an authorized
entity. In the VANET context, the traffic authority is
the ideal holder of this matter. Other trusted service
providers (e.g. technical inspection facilities) may take
this role as well. The process is shown in Fig. 6. In
this case, the central ITS station’s HSM is used to open
the commitment (msgs. 1–5). This leads to obtaining
the pseudonym under which the vehicle is operating.
Based on this information, the Security MIB reveals
which is the real identity of the misbehaving vehicleb
(msgs. 6–9).
6 Performance assessment
While the previous section focused on how ABCs may be
integrated into VANETs, this section assesses the suitability
of the said integration. Particularly, a performance com-
parison between Idemix, U-Prove and VANET-updated
Persiano is presented. Considering this aspect as well as
the provision of privacy properties (recall Section 3.4),
Section 6.3 discusses the feasibility of each ABC technique
in the considered use cases.
For this assessment, we have adopted the framework for
evaluation of Privacy-ABC technologies proposed in [56].
We enhance this framework by considering additional cri-
teria particularly useful for understanding the potential of
ABCs in VANETs. Accordingly, we show empirical results
obtained from a quantitative analysis focused on latency.
We have used the ABC4Trust reference implementation [6]
of a unified architecture for ABC technologies, which currently
integrates Idemix and U-Prvove technologies, and the imple-
mentation of VANET-updated Persiano introduced in [25].
For the sake of simplicity, we did not use all of the criteria
described in [56], but only those elements that were com-
mon for the three technologies and which we considered to
be suitable for the scenarios we have chosen. Particularly,
we evaluated the time taken for system setup, issuance, as
well as time to do a presentation, which is split into two
parts, namely proving, which happens at the User side (in
our case, on the vehicle), and verification, which is done
by the verifier (in our case, by the Central ITS Station).
For all these phases, this assessment focuses on the com-
putational time taken on same machine configurations. It
must be noted that this time is independent of the particular
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Fig. 5 Presentation phase of ABC according to VANET architecture
road traffic scenario. Thus, network-related incidental fac-
tors such as the road design (which may affect coverage
range) or vehicular density (which may alter channel avail-
ability) are left out of the analysis. Therefore, our analysis
shows an unavoidable, lower-bound time taken to carry out
these computations.
6.1 Experimental setup
We have considered different setups for the different enti-
ties, namely the Central ITS station and the OBU. In order
to provide a modest setup for the Central ITS Station, we
used a machine with an 8-core i7 CPU of 2.3 GHz and 8
GB of RAM. Regarding the OBU, we simulated the exper-
iments on a less powerful machine with a 3-core CPU of
460 Mhz and 256 MB of RAM, comparable to state-of-the-
art devices, such as the OBU-201U.3 Thus, each of these
machines carry out the steps and operations that correspond
to its entity in every ABC technique.
We have performed a number of simulations using vary-
ing parameters, such as the number of attributes in a cre-
dential, disclosing (hiding) attributes, and increasing the key
size for the crypto operations. For the sake of clarity, the
3http://unex.com.tw/v2x/obu-201u, last accessed January 2017.
performance of each phase for the three technologies is dis-
cussed separately. Each experiment has been run 50 times,
showing the average herein. We assume credentials with 2,
5 and 10 attributes and key sizes 1024 and 2048 bits. We
believe these values are representative, and appropriate from
the security point of view [54]. Appendix presents the main
data obtained from experiments, which are discussed herein.
6.2 Performance results
Regarding system setup (Fig. 7), all steps to generate the
necessary cryptographic materials, including the public-
private key pairs of the issuer and verifier, are measured.
The most efficient technology regarding this phase is U-
Prove, which completes the system setup in 2.5 and 24.3 s
for key sizes 1024 bits and 2048 bits, respectively, followed
by VANET-updated Persiano with 5.6 and 38.5 s and U-
Prove with 14.8 and 58.5 s for key sizes 1024 bits and 2048
bits, respectively. Results show a significant increase for
2048 bits key, being specially remarkable in U-Prove whose
suffers an increment of 1200%.
With respect to issuance (Fig. 7), a credential with five
attributes using a 1024 bits key with VANET-updated Per-
siano takes on average 0.09 s, with U-Prove 2.1 s, whereas
with Idemix 2.8 s For 2048 bits key, though the increase
of VANET-updated Persiano is the highest one, it continues
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Fig. 6 Credential inspection
phase of ABC according to
VANET architecture
being the technology which produces the lowest impact in
the issuance phase, it takes 0.6 s in comparison with U-
Prove and Idemix which take 5.5 and 3.4 s, respectively.
According to Section 3, these results are expected because
U-Prove requires two rounds to complete the issuance
while Idemix requires one. Likewise, VANET-updated Per-
siano needs to demonstrate the possession of attributes in
an non-anonymous fashion. Note that, according to our
experiments, issuance time is independent of the number
of attributes and thus we have chosen five attributes as a
representative value.
Certainly, the most relevant results for the use of these
techniques while driving are those related to the presenta-
tion of Privacy-ABCs. In particular, proving possession of
credentials (by the OBU) and verification of such proofs
(by the Central ITS) are at stake. We have studied the per-
formance for the three technologies using a cryptographic
key size of 1024 bits when presenting a credential with five
attributes and iteratively disclosing attributes (Fig. 8). It is
identified that Idemix is the best choice, as it presents the
lowest time either for proving or verification, while U-Prove
and VANET-updated Persiano are comparable. Moreover,
the number of disclosed attributes does not significantly
affect computation time.
Similarly, Fig. 9 shows results for the same configura-
tion but doubling the key size to 2048 bits. Though time
increases in all technologies, the high computation time
required in the proving phase is particularly remarkable in
VANET-updated Persiano. Indeed, in this last technology,
credential proving requires the computation of ZK-POKs
which are highly affected by the key size [25].
Finally, the impact of the number of attributes on the presen-
tation time for all three technologies is assessed (Fig. 10).
Here, each technology is assessed when presenting (prov-
ing and verifying) credentials with respectively 2, 5 and
10 attributes using a key size of 1024 bits (2048 key size
is not studied because VANET-updated Persiano produces
very high impact, e.g. computation time for proving higher
than 22 s.). It is identified that Idemix continues being the
best alternative considering computation time and, though
Fig. 7 Evaluation for the
impact of setup and issuance for
all three technologies
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Fig. 8 Evaluation for the
impact of the selective
disclosure on the time efficiency
of presentation. Results based
on the key size of 1024 bits and
a credential with five attributes
for all three technologies
VANET-updated Persiano is worse at verification, it is com-
parable with U-Prove at proving and even better when 10
attributes are at stake.
6.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion
Given the different nature of the use cases at stake, the time
constraints can be determinant to adopt or reject ABC tech-
niques. To this extent, in this section, the time taken to carry
out each phase is studied.
The first point to consider is the high impact of 2048
bits key specially for VANET-updated Persiano. The use
of this technology and key size is not recommendable
for use cases when significant immediacy is demanding,
e.g. automatic access control. This result may be produced
by the fact that while U-Prove and Idemix have tested
and well-known implementations, VANET-updated Per-
siano implementation has not reached such a high level of
maturity.
Regarding setup and issuance, both phases are com-
puted by trusted authorities which are assumed to have
stronger computational capabilities. Furthermore, involved
communication is not an issue since they may take place in
controlled scenarios (e.g. technical inspection).
The proving and verification steps of the presentation
phase are the main challenge to address. Although the use
cases at stake are not safety-related, a practical feasibil-
ity threshold exists. In case that a given ABC mechanisms
Fig. 9 Evaluation for the
impact of the selective
disclosure on the time efficiency
of presentation. Results based
on the key size of 2048 bits and
a credential with five attributes
for all three technologies
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takes too long to execute, the vehicle may be far away from
its original location when the protocol started. This ren-
ders some use cases impractical. For example, the limited
access warning use case is intended to warn approach-
ing vehicles. If ABCs involve a huge time for execution,
the vehicle may have passed through the controlled area.
Similarly, the access control and parking use case cannot
wait for a long time in practice—the vehicle must be autho-
rized prior to area entrance (for security) and it cannot be
stuck for a long time before leaving (for practical reasons).
It must be recalled that this situation may get worse in
geographically harsh scenarios or roads with high density,
as the packet delivery ratio (which indicates the propor-
tion of correctly received packets) decreases dramatically
[2]. In such situation, re-transmission costs increase the
mechanism latency. However, for the sake of consistency,
in the following, we leave networking aspects out of the
discussion.
Considering these issues, our feasibility analysis con-
centrates on the distance traveled by the vehicle while
computing the proving and verification phases in each
ABC mechanism. Thus, considering 42 m/s (i.e. around
150 km/h) as driving speed, 1024 bits for key sizes and
five disclosed attributes, the vehicle will be moving for
115.1 m in VANET-updated Persiano, 102.5 m in U-Prove
and 18.1 m in Idemix. If 2048 bits were considered, results
would be affected specially in VANET-updated Persiano,
requiring 1043.3 m to complete.
Combining the previous results with the theoretical suit-
ability of ABC mechanisms per VANET use case (recall
Section 4.3), an overall suitability can be concluded. Thus,
Idemix is the most suitable technique since except for the
issuance phase, it offers the best performance results. The
reduced driving distance is specially relevant for uses cases
in which DSRC communications technology comes into
play. Recalling Table 2, it happens in the limited access
warning, automatic access control, ITS e-commerce and
loading zone management use cases. According to our find-
ings, data transmission has to be carried out in 300−18.1 =
281.9 m driving distance for these use cases to be feasible,
if 300 m is taken as the effective communication range [2]
and no geonetworking or RSU handover is considered. Of
course, this threshold can be raised by relaxing any of the
previous conditions.
On the other hand, media downloading is also feasible by
using U-Prove or VANET-updated Persiano. Nevertheless,
U-Prove is dramatically more efficient than VANET-
updated Persiano. Particularly, as four attributes are at stake
in this use case (recall Table 2), U-Prove is almost three
times faster than VANET-updated Persiano. This difference
is relevant if the anonymous authentication is to be carried
out periodically (e.g. after each downloadedchunk), astheshorterthe
process takes, the faster the download is completed.
Finally, recalling that both Idemix and U-Prove can be
applied in the fleet management use case, Idemix is the most
suitable choice for performance issues and the only one if
multi-show unlinkability is needed.
7 Open research issues
The use of ABCs into smart city services built on top
of VANETs opens the door to three main research direc-
tions, namely the real-world implementation and assess-
ment of this technology, the extension to other use cases
and the improvement of the cryptographic primitives at
stake.
Concerning the real-world assessment, the networking
aspect of ABC is a critical factor. Our results support
the computational feasibility of ABCs in vehicular envi-
ronments. Thus, they enable carrying out another step of
experiments, which consider the impact of channel reliabil-
ity. In particular, as vehicular density affects to the packet
delivery ratio, it is important to assess the suitability of every
ITS use case design in different road traffic scenarios, rang-
ing from rural areas (with sparse RSU coverage and low
traffic) to urban settings (with high RSU coverage and high
density of vehicles).
Fig. 10 Evaluation for the
impact of the total number of
attributes in a credential on the
time efficiency of presentation.
Results based on the key size of
1024 bits and no disclosed
attributes for all three
technologies
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Regarding the extension to other use cases, the following
list may serve as a starting point for designing promising
smart city services in which ABCs may be at stake:
– Parking meter: modern cities usually have parking
meters spread around them. Parking cost is dependent
on factors like the type or the age of the vehicle to
park. Some parking meters require the user to type the
vehicle’s license plate. However, this enables a potential
“big brother” effect by authorities. Thus, parking meter
tickets have to be delivered just taking into account
particular factors.
– Start the vehicle: from the development of tradi-
tional keys to start vehicles until present time many
techniques have emerged. Smart-keys are challeng-
ing developments in this regard which are applied by
multiple carmakers [47]. These keys may have the look
and feel of a card or just a small rectangular box. The
point is that some vehicles may be driven by people who
share some common features. For instance, bus drivers
of company A are allowed to drive all buses of this
company, thus each of them needs a personal key that
attests their link with the company and can be used in all
coaches. Furthermore, to avoid excessive surveillance,
the actual identity of the driver should only be disclosed
under particular circumstances (e.g. traffic offences).
– Incentives for users profiling: in VANETs content dis-
semination scenarios, users and service providers may
find a privacy-preserving tradeoff—service providers
will be able to build profiles from anonymized users
and deliver personalized services, while users might
receive other incentives in exchange of disclosing their
attributes, such as, special offers or discount coupons
[32]. It must be noted that users must be able to control
the amount and linkability of the information disclosed.
Implementation issues of ABCs have to be considered as
well. In particular, improving HSM native support for ABCs
could dramatically improve the overall performance. On the
other hand, the development of Proofs of Knowledge (PoK)
based on lightweight cryptography would be also beneficial.
As OBUs are resource-constrained devices, leveraging on
cryptography for similar environments (such as Internet of
Things [5] or smart health [52]) is a promising approach.
8 Conclusions
Road traffic services are essential in the future develop-
ment of smart cities. They can be designed on top of the
upcoming vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). However,
privacy aspects in this scenario must be addressed prior to
their deployment. Multiple cryptographic approaches have
been developed in this regard, particularly those focused on
traditional PKI systems. However, in many situations, too
much unnecessary data is delivered in contrast to the prin-
ciple of minimum information disclosure. Attribute-Based
Credentials (ABCs) help to address this issue by allowing
the disclosure of only the necessary data. In this paper, the
suitability of three prominent ABC techniques (U-Prove,
Idemix and VANET-updated Persiano) to VANETs has been
studied. A set of smart city services, chosen from ETSI’s
Basic Set of Applications, has been considered for the
analysis. Our results show that they are feasible accord-
ing to current state-of-the-art devices and that they can be
applied taking into account the standard vehicular architec-
ture. Moreover, Idemix is the most promising approach for
this scenario both in terms of performance and the set of
smart city road traffic services that could adopt it.
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Appendix: Performance results
In the following, Tables 6, 7 and 8 present complete results
of the experimental study.
Table 6 Evaluation of the impact of setup and issuance
VANET-upd. Persiano Idemix U-Prove
Setup Issuance Setup Issuance Setup Issuance
1024 bits
5615 97 14829 2873 2563 2182
2048 bits
38500 649 58522 3402 24351 5579
Time in miliseconds for key sizes 1024 and 2048
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Table 7 Evaluation of the impact of proving and verification
# Disclosed attributes Proving Verification Proving Verification Proving Verification
2 attributes 5 attributes 10 attributes
VANET-upd. Persiano
0 2181 274 2230 316 2319 320
1 2346 262 2329 310 2235 315
2 2375 263 2341 302 2440 304
3 2410 282 2508 264
4 2457 284 2544 257







0 402 34 511 34 596 39
1 389 33 482 35 578 38
2 374 31 447 35 566 38
3 449 34 530 38
4 429 34 510 38







0 1866 34 2239 34 2747 39
1 1848 33 2340 35 2954 38
2 1878 31 2466 35 2764 37
3 2340 34 3062 38
4 2466 34 3046 38






Time in miliseconds for key size 1024, having 2, 5 and 10 attributes, disclosing different number of attributes
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Table 8 Evaluation of the impact of proving and verification
# Disclosed attributes VANET-upd. Persiano Idemix U-Prove
Proving Verification Proving Verification Proving Verification
1024 bits
0 2230 316 511 34 2239 34
1 2329 310 482 35 2340 35
2 2341 302 447 35 2466 35
3 2410 282 449 34 2340 34
4 2457 284 429 34 2466 34
5 2463 284 399 33 2407 33
2048 bits
0 19950 1953 2003 182 3038 393
1 20248 1910 1916 177 3062 392
2 20398 1920 1931 171 3167 398
3 21974 1954 1861 165 3217 406
4 22691 1971 1810 160 3176 406
5 22841 2001 1759 155 3178 407
Time in miliseconds for key sizes 1024 and 2048, having 5 attributes and disclosing different number of attributes
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